universal access to health care, a focus on population health, payment reforms, and cost control. In a related initiative mandated through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) rather than the ACA, all public and private health care providers and other eligible professionals were required to demonstrate "meaningful use" of electronic medical records by January 1, 2014 in order to avoid government sanctions. 3 Other than meaningful use, many of these ideas were rooted in earlier attempts at managed care and in established health care systems abroad, even if they were implemented differently. Nevertheless, both patients and physicians complain about changes in the nature of the doctor-patient relationship in the wake of the ACA and the ARRA, and many ascribe the changes to health care reform. DAGI token, changes in the doctor-patient relationship are always accompanied by ethical repercussions, real or perceived, specific or generic.
The discussion that follows outlines 7 ethical issues of immediate relevance to the practice of neurosurgery in the current health care environment. They cannot all be linked specifically to the ARRA, to the ACA, or to particular aspects of legislated or proposed health care reform. Nevertheless, they reflect pressing concerns that are very likely to remain relevant as society continues to explore innovations in health care delivery.
Ethics and Ethical Dilemmas in the Health Care Reform
Ethics is defined as a body of thought concerned with the meanings, uses, and implications of "good" and "right;" with rules for differentiating right from wrong, and good from bad; with rules for behavior in pursuit of the good and the right; with questions of virtue, or goodness of character; with the derivation of authority for ethical rules; with concepts of distributive and procedural justice and of fairness; and with the analysis and resolution of moral problems. 5 The word "ethics" is used both in the singular, as an abbreviation for "the subject of ethics, and in the plural, with a meaning closer to "rules."
The terms "good" and "right" have overlapping meanings. The words are used sometimes in an ethical sense ("areteically"), at other times in a technical or a nonethical sense ("nonareteically"). To describe as surgeon as "good" might be involve a moral judgment ("of good character"), a technical assessment ("adept and proficient"), or both. The description "good hospital" is equally ambiguous. Is a good hospital good because it provides access to good doctors? Does it deliver good outcomes? Is the staff populated with good people? Is it run with deference to a higher calling or mission? This overlap is of particular importance in medical ethics.
Medical ethics is well ensconced in American medicine. Ongoing discussions around the ethics of informed consent, abortion, brain death, patients' rights, and end-of-life care began more than 50 years ago. Many issues have been settled, while others remain controversial. In either case, the vast majority of these matters have become reasonably familiar to physicians and to the public at large. Discussions around a number of other contemporary ethical topics, including health disparities, health equity, cost containment, payment reform, quality of care, and additional topics linked to health care policy (and health care reform), in contrast, have been more limited. To the extent they have entered public consciousness, they have done so largely in the context of debates around health care reform and the rights, roles, and obligations of stakeholders in the health care system.
No version of health care reform, which arguably began in the USA with a proposal for health insurance in the early 20th century considered by President Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party (and even earlier outside the USA), has succeeded in satisfying every possible stakeholder. Health care reform has a very broad ambit. Irrespective of whether it is implemented directly, through explicit government involvement; indirectly, by dint of public policy initiatives; or as a hybrid of public policy and private industry participation, health care reform involves the funding and delivery of health care for a particular population (eg, workers, children, the aged and other vulnerable populations; in universal health care, everyone may be included) within a certain jurisdiction. 6 Many advocates strongly believe that there exists a socially based, moral imperative to support health care reform. This imperative, in turn, is associated with a claim for a right to health care and a corresponding social obligation to provide and to fund health care. As a practical matter, health care reforms in the USA and elsewhere have also had to contend with a balance between universal access, inelastic demand, quality, and cost. Whether one likes the word "rationing" or not, the balance inevitably involves rationing and rationing decisions.
With this construct in mind, and despite its limitations, health care reform can be and often has been framed as an areteically "good" idea, even though influential organizations (not the least of which is the American Medical Association) have reversed position on this matter over the years. Politics and economics seem to play at least as strong a role as ethics and social conscience. 7 A critical review of health care reform and the motivations that surround it falls well beyond the purview of this discussion, even though it is inextricably linked to the subject at hand. For purposes of this discussion, it suffices to agree that the call for health care reform has been and remains an influential factor in American medicine and American politics; that health care reform inevitably affects the doctor-patient relationship; and that changes in the doctor-patient relationship may carry disproportionate ethical implications. This is not a discussion of whether health care reform ought to proceed or ought to be repealed. It does not pretend to judge whether the ACA has succeeded or failed. It is indifferent to the politics that surrounds it. This discussion is about ethical issues that commonly arise in conjunction with many forms and embodiments of health care reform wherever and whenever they have been instituted.
Seven Ethical Issues Affecting the Neurosurgeon

Accountability of Physicians and Surgeons to Individual Patients
Under most circumstances, physicians and surgeons are held accountable solely or principally to their individual patients in matters of medical decision making. Conflicts may arise in egregious circumstances such as mass casualty disasters, military conflicts and epidemics, and within the role definitions of public health practitioners, who, generally and notably, do not carry accountability for individual patients as part of their role responsibilities. In general, however, and while acknowledging that a list of exceptions can be generated, an individual consulting a neurosurgeon has the right to expect that the neurosurgeon will be guided by the best interests of that individual alone. The advice given and the decisions taken will not be tainted by other considerations.
That is not intended to mean, however, that the neurosurgeon acts unilaterally or paternalistically, without voluntary and fully informed consent and discussion with the patient. It does not undermine the principles autonomy and of shared decisionmaking process. It does not mean that the patient will always agree with the surgeon's judgment or follow instructions perfectly. It does mean that the neurosurgeon is governed by the principle that, to the extent possible, conflicting interests will not intrude on decisions affecting an individual's care.
The role of the ACA as well as many other examples of health care reform in placing an explicit emphasis on population health has been already been noted. There are many dimensions to this concept, some more problematic than others. It is hard to argue, for example, with the idea of prioritizing clean water supplies and vaccination over neonatal intensive care for highly premature infants after a devastating earthquake in an emerging economy. That priority is categorically different, however, from the hypothetical idea that a neurosurgeon should advise against the treatment of a high-grade glioma in an elderly individual because the prospects are dim, the costs of health care are rising faster than inflation, and because some segments of society suffer from inadequate access to health care. This is not to say that neurosurgeons are asked to give such advice, only that that it would be problematic if they were.
One of the difficult questions in ethics is the fundamental question about the meaning of "good." Does "good" pertain to duties (deontology), or to outcomes (teleology), or some combination? Does "good" link to principles or authority or to rulefollowing? It is hard to divorce the emphasis on population health from a strongly teleological utilitarian perspective on what makes for good medicine. In the context of population health, the best medicine is often defined, at least in part, as the "the best health for the greatest number." This definition or some variation of it is also commonly called upon as a principal goal in health care reform.
The problem is that the meaning and measurement of "the best health" are not self-evident. This term and this concept must be defined externally. The criteria reflect matters of policy and priority. So to define a surgeon's accountability in terms of the optimization of population-based medicine is a confusing and difficult ethical challenge.
It is not that surgeon's duties do not entail social accountability: they do, but not necessarily according to a model that prioritizes the benefit of the collective over the benefit of the individual. In day-to-day practice, in caring for individual patients, the neurosurgeon is primarily accountable to the individual patient. The neurosurgeon is also accountable to the community, of course, and is expected to be a good citizen with respect to taking emergency call, caring for patients irrespective of ability to pay, taking on the often gratuitous mantle of leadership on the hospital staff or in community organizations, and doing other things for the good and welfare of the public. For some neurosurgeons, that may mean a career in innovation as well-pursuing improvements in technique and instrumentation, in the understanding of disease, and in the delivery of neurosurgical services, in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of care. None of these activities, however, entails a compromise to the standards of care for individual patients. Any request to modify the care of individual patients because of a need to address population health should be analyzed with care and regarded concern if not suspicion.
Financial Incentives and Motivations
The system of financial incentives proposed for many emerging models of care may create conflicting interests. This is not a problem unique to health care to any particular system of health care delivery or any specific proposal for health care reform.
In an integrated delivery network, for example, salary and incentives can be related to volume, to quality, or to some sliding scale assessment that emphasizes both. On the surface, each appears reasonable. Each is also open to misuse, however.
Volume must reflect not only the quantity of work done, but also the indications for that work. Measures chosen to assess the quality of care must be appropriate and relevant. The issues surrounding quality assessment are discussed elsewhere in this supplement. It is essential that neurosurgeons insist upon specialty-specific, specialty-suitable, and relevant models of quality assessment.
A serious threat to optimal care comes from the retained cash model. This model links physician salaries and reimbursements in a capitated arrangement to the moneys retained within a health care system or by a health care system at certain predetermined intervals. Reward is linked to cash retained: the more retained, the higher the distribution to the physicians.
This model creates incentives for denial or restriction of care. It also creates a potential for very severe conflicts among the members of a multispecialty group. Physicians (nonsurgeons) working in such systems may benefit financially by withholding referral for surgical care. The role of the surgeon, in contrast, is to offer and provide surgical care when appropriate. While case-based outcome assessments should, in theory, provide a balance between these forces, they often do not. This problem is especially marked in cases where treatment might be costly and on the whole be only marginally effective, but may, in selected instances, result in very satisfactory outcomes, or where outcome assessment is not case-based. When companion diagnostics or biomarkers prove useful in selecting populations more likely to benefit from expensive treatments, both the decision-making process and retrospective analyses are easier. Sometimes, however, the benefits can only be denominated in more subjective and elusive terms such as quality of life, whose value cannot be established purely on the basis of a quantitative analysis.
The word "marginal" was introduced to refer to particular categories of benefit and outcome in health care (this use is not necessarily connected with health care reform except insofar as policy makers choose to use marginality as a trigger for restricting or denying treatment). "Marginality" is a value judgment. Oncology drugs have been granted FDA clearance on the basis of an increased survival denominated in weeks or months: marginal to some, but not to all. Should retained cash considerations influence or drive the decision around decompression for malignant middle cerebral artery ischemic stroke, for example? Is a 1 grade difference in modified Rankin Score a triumph or a marginal benefit?
A debate on the merits surrounding this kind of decision lies beyond the purview of the current discussion. All that can be said here is that financial incentives may exert undue and regrettable influence when it comes to deploying innovative treatments or exercising judgment calls. Salaries and bonuses must not be based on denial of appropriate care, nor should financial considerations alone drive therapeutic decisions.
Matters of Leadership and Conflicting Interests
Because of their capabilities and their status, neurosurgeons are often sought out and brought into leadership positions in both academic and administrative settings. Indeed, in this supplement, neurosurgeons are encouraged to seek leadership positions. It is very difficult, however, to avoid conflicting interests and conflicting in role responsibilities entirely.
For example, it is possible for physicians to hold both administrative and academic roles. The administrative role may carry management responsibilities and fiduciary obligations to an institution or organization. The academic role may as well, but the 2 may be quite different. This is often the case when a hospital is owned and managed separately from a medical school that serves as its academic umbrella.
The American corporate world generally refers to "conflicts of interest," whereas the British prefers to speak of "conflicting interests." "Conflicting interests" is probably the better, or at least the more useful term. It is generally thought that conflicts of interest can be cured by disclosure. While that is true in many cases from a strictly legal perspective, it is not universally true from a practical perspective. Some conflicts cannot be cured in this way. From the ethical perspective, it is often more helpful to think about mitigating conflicting interests than eliminating or curing conflicts of interest.
Leadership requires vision, management skills, communication, insight and, very importantly, altruism and selflessness. The development of a business plan, the governance of an institution, the sustainability of a training program, and the optimization of patient care all involve prioritization of resources and an understanding of the underlying personal and institutional values that any such prioritization inevitably entails.
Conflicting interests in this setting are virtually impossible to avoid. They must be managed. It is very difficult to mitigate conflicts adequately unless their existence is sought and acknowledged. Sound leadership requires that conflicting interests be disclosed and managed. The relevant principles are derived from corporate law as well as ethics.
While leaders in medical and academic institutions are not necessarily held to the same standard as corporate directors, it is useful and important to understand what is expected of directors in the corporate world. 8 The law differs with respect to leaders who are not corporate directors. Nevertheless, many of the principles are analogous. 9 Three principles govern the behavior of corporate directors in the United States: good faith, loyalty, and due care. A great deal has been written about what these standards actually mean, what they should mean, how they may be changing, and how they are interpreted in various settings. It is worth familiarizing one's self with this area.
It is a good idea for neurosurgeons who are considering leadership positions to request a briefing from corporate counsel before accepting. They should be prepared to disclose and discuss potentially conflicting interests in private and with appropriate safeguards. Good boards often do this as a matter of course, and have established conflict of interest policies and committees on which to fall back. With that said, ethics are not necessarily the same as law. Both matter in the corporate setting, even though they may not exactly coincide. Careful assessment of conflicting interests within the context of leadership positions is a useful safeguard for both the surgeon and the institution.
Preservation of Patient Autonomy
Two central and overlapping principles in medical ethics are patient autonomy-the right of patients to make autonomous decisions-and respect for persons-the obligation of physicians to respect the rights and dignities of individuals. They overlap: both support and sustain the standard that patients have the right to make decisions concerning their care. This principle has penetrated broadly into American medicine. One result of the penetration of this principle is the general rejection of paternalistic models of patient care and the pursuit of shared decisionmaking models. A second is the evolution of robust standards for voluntary informed consent for surgery. 10 An unexplored effect of some of the incentives embraced by the ACA is a reduction of patient autonomy. There is also a corresponding imposition on specialists to become or to act as change managers, persuading patients to do what might be in their best interests, but may not be to their liking.
The underlying instincts are entirely laudable: How could one object to a surgeon counseling a patient to stop smoking, or exercise more, or lose weight? These are important public health initiatives, and also important in terms of holistic patient care.
On the other hand, when the surgeon is graded (and perhaps even rewarded) on the basis of the outcomes of counseling and other intercessions intended to change patient behavior, it is very easy to cross a line. Physician behaviors otherwise deemed objectionable, including exploiting asymmetries of power, threatening to withdraw care, invoking family pressure, and other frankly manipulative interventions are tolerated-if not actively encouraged-in pursuit of behavioral changes deemed beneficial to the patient. Such measures would not be deemed permissible in obtaining informed consent for surgery (even where the surgery is clearly indicated and even potentially life saving) nor in trying to obtain consent for medical treatments of other kinds. And yet in this setting, where the surgeon is charged with and graded according to patients' changes in behavior, they are disregarded.
Among other things, this change in the nature of the doctorpatient relationships is an expression of an interest conflicting with a principle: the interest of health care managers in improving the health of populations on the one hand conflicts with the principle of patient autonomy on the other. And while the surgeon is very likely to share the managers' interests when it comes to the health of the patient whose treatment she or he has undertaken, overriding a patient's consent is another matter.
Little if any attention has been devoted to this conflict. Surgeons may respond in 2 ways. They may feel their role is be as beneficently persuasive as they can, or they can decide that their part in patient management should not extend to the broader role of preventative health, and certainly not coercively.
When a duty for the implementation of intervention is imposed on the surgeon-the surgeon is graded on outcomes including weight loss, or hemoglobin A1C, or smoking cessation-the surgeon's role in providing specialty care may be compromised. Besides violating patient autonomy, this requirement poses the additional challenge of finding the time needed to document the fulfillment of this and comparable requirements.
While it may be impossible to avoid the imposition of such requirements entirely, it is important that the surgeon continue to value, respect, and support patient autonomy, whether in the instance of consent for surgery or in other situations where the capacity and the competence of the patient are intact.
Information Exchange and Communication
In pursuit of cost control, health care provider organizations may establish closed panels and limit access to expert care. Whether this tactic is adopted for revenue optimization or for reasons of quality management does not much matter if specialized care is required but access is constrained.
Some payers and provider organizations have been known to require their professional employees and contractors to limit therapeutic recommendations and referrals to published formularies for drugs and biologicals, and to network physicians for providers. This can be done by stipulation (an agreement required to practice as part of the organization) or, less blatantly and sometimes more effectively, by interference.
The constraints imposed on the surgeon can be divided into 2 categories. One pertains to the exchange of information and the other to prescription and referral.
In order to meet the legal requirements for fully informed surgical consent, patients must be advised of alternatives and consequences to any recommended intervention. The ramifications of this principle in a managed care environment are not clearly defined. If in the opinion of a surgeon, a patient referred for surgery, and for whom surgery is quite possibly an option, is better served by an out-of-network referral, can that information be disclosed to the patient and can that referral be made? If a procedure or a drug not endorsed by the provider network or the insurer is better than other options, in the practitioner's opinion, may that information be disclosed?
Leaving aside the legal question, against which there is considerable case law and precedent to cite, there is an important ethical challenge. Whether framed in terms of conflicting interests, best interests of the patient, or patient autonomy, patients have the right to be fully informed of alternatives and consequences before agreeing to a course of treatment, and this kind of information should not be withheld.
As a matter of prudence and routine, neurosurgeons are encouraged to commission a review of the employment or contractual agreement by competent legal counsel prior to engaging with payers or insurers or provider organizations. The matter of restraint of communication and limited referral and prescription policies should be considered in the course of such review.
Electronic Health Records and Data Security
The ARRA-driven mandate for the use of electronic health records is linked to an increasing emphasis on the use of medical analytics as part of the toolbox for effective population health. The benefits of using anonymized patient information to extract descriptive and predictive analytical data are well established and the idea is laudable. Such data can serve both inductive (hypothesis testing) and deductive (hypothesis generating) purposes and offer the opportunity to yield unsuspected and obscure associations and correlations. Nevertheless, there are important ethical issues that have fallen out.
First, it has become apparent that even the most highly secured databases are vulnerable to penetration. Medical data repositories are no less so. They seem to have become attractive targets. The more data are shared, the higher the risks. Despite the evolution of cybersecurity protocols, breaches abound. Data security involves an obligation to guarantee physical security as well as network and cybersecurity. The obligation to protect patient data is both legal and ethical. 11, 12 Indeed, even the involvement of IT security professionals is no guarantee of safety.
Another problem is that of perpetuating error. Small mistakes have can have huge implications. For example, if a document using the abbreviation "std" for standard was entered into an electronic health record with an optical character recognition scanning program, it might very well interpret the abbreviation as signaling "sexually transmitted disease." Carried along in a medical record, that erroneous entry could conceivably have an impact on insurance eligibility and cost-not to mention on spousal relationships and children. Thus, there is a special obligation to verify what is entered to make sure that errors are not perpetuated.
Third, there is the problem of unauthorized access and privacy. Whether or not harm ensues from a breach, patients have the right to have their medical information kept private. That is sometimes easily overlooked when part of a medical record is retrieved and forwarded electronically for totally legitimate purposes and with the patient's consent: scattered information or a hidden link can be used to identify data that should be anonymized or to see information that should not have been sent. This is a particular problem when medical records are shared for administrative rather than medical purposes. Despite the fact that patients are asked formally for their consent to access records or share them, more often than not they do not really have a choice. It is neither a fully voluntary nor a fully informed consent.
Finally, there are additional problems pertaining to the innocent receipt of information from a third party-information that should not have ever been transmitted in the form in which it was received but now constitutes a virtually inseparable part of the record into which it was incorporated.
It is very hard for the neurosurgeon to stay abreast of these kinds of issues. For those without specific proficiency and interest, it may be advisable to appoint and train a data security officer within the practice and to consult with appropriate experts on a regular basis. This is of particular importance for neurosurgeons who assume leadership roles in medical organizations.
The Use and Misuse of Big Data; Protecting the Prerogatives of Surgeons and Patients
The promise of big data is derived from its ability to aid in hypothesis testing and generation, and from its capacity to elicit and demonstrate new and valuable insights. The value of big data is statistical: sampling process error should decrease as a function of sample size. Sampling process error should drop to zero when sample size coincides with the size of the population of interest taken as a whole and each of the members of the population (the population set) is represented.
Put differently, the larger the sample size, the more closely the sample resembles the population of interest. Size alone, of course, does not eliminate other sources of error and bias. Nevertheless, as the sample size increases, standard deviation decreases. Thus, a "truer" picture of the entire population emerges. This remains true so long as the sample is unbiased (big data based on a biased sample does not solve the problem of bias). Thus, the danger of big data is that it may be huge but not representative, even though the analysis is performed correctly.
So called "precision" or "customized" medicine is complementary to big data. It promises to integrate a huge mass of data so as to better inform the treatment of individual patients. Similar caveats apply.
The ethical question is what to do about the data once it has been collected and analyzed. It is ethically important to separate the results of statistical analysis from, for example, (1) statistically significant but clinically irrelevant outcomes; (2) judgments about how data about the set should be applied to specific individuals within the set; (3) the protection of the prerogatives of individual patients in the face of population-based protocols; and (4) the protection of the surgeon's prerogatives in personalizing the treatment of individual patients. The question of what should be done with probabilities and statistics is not statistical in the least: it is entirely a value judgment.
From an historical perspective, the problem is an example of what is known formally as the "is-ought" controversy. 13 First identified by David Hume (1711-1776) , a Scottish philosopher and economist, this controversy has been identified as the central problem in moral philosophy, and it remains a central problem in protocolized care. 14 Hume objected to the idea of linking what ought to be (a prescriptive or normative claim in the language of ethics and philosophy) to what is (what can be shown factuallyor in our case statistically-to be true). These 2 statements, 1 descriptive and 1 prescriptive, he argued, were not obviously connected. This principal has been called Hume's law or Hume's guillotine because it severs the 2. 15 The distinction between "ought" and "is" has also been called the fact/value distinction or controversy.
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Some 20th century philosophers, notably Hilary Putnam, argued that the is/ought or fact/value dichotomy did not actually exist in the form and along the lines propounded by Hume. Nevertheless, in terms of reducing population data to protocols directing the treatment of individuals, it does, and the overarching concerns embedded in the fact/value distinction remain critical to the ethical challenges posed by big data.
The nub of the problem is the relationship of the set to the individual. 17 The set is the population. As already noted, it is important to eliminate sampling error to the extent possible in order to derive useful and accurate data from a set. Assuming that an accurate, unbiased statistical analysis of a representative sample of the population can be obtained with minimal sample process error, one ought to be able, hypothetically, to reliably state conclusions of the following form: …the outlook is not so good for people with the most quickly growing astrocytomas (grade 4 -glioblastoma multiforme GBM), particularly over the age of 65. Many people live for less than a year. Around 6 in 100 people (6%) survive for 5 years or more after diagnosis. People who have a particular gene called MGMT turned off (methylated) in their tumour cells tend to live longer and respond better to certain types of chemotherapy. Just over 1 in 3 people with glioblastoma multiforme have this gene change. For a person under the age of 50, with no disability, an MGMT methylated GBM, who has had surgery where the surgeon has been able to remove 90% of the tumour or more, has around a 2 in 3 chance of being alive at 2 years [sic]. 18 Assuming that these data and these conclusions regarding the set or population of patients with glioblastoma multiforme are correct (the "is," or the "fact" part of the equation), what does that say about the management of an individual patient? Is there a normative conclusion (a "prescription") that necessarily follows or ought to follow (the "ought," or the "value" part of the equation)?
This is the essence of the problem around treatment protocols emanating from big data. There are 2 separate questions to consider. Each carries important ethical implications for the neurosurgeon and neurosurgery.
First, does the fact alone that 66% of the population with certain genomic characteristics has a particular natural history, or that 85% respond in a certain way to a certain treatment protocol, necessarily mean that any individual patient will respond in that way? Is there a particular statistical threshold that confers sufficient certainty ("fact") to warrant a statistically based treatment decision irrespective of the patient's individuality, particularly one that involves rationing or withholding care on the grounds of ineffectiveness or, even more starkly, futility ("value")? A number of neurosurgical conditions are sufficiently rare, unusual, or dire to be disparaged in a paradigm that emphasizes population health over patient individuality.
Second, does this approach to medical decision making unfairly eliminate the option of choosing a treatment protocol that carries a likelihood of success which, while admittedly very low, is still better that any known alternative and is hoped for, however, unrealistically? Particularly for patients with rare, malignant, or otherwise serious conditions, this is a very important question. The option that has been eliminated may include experimental treatments or treatments with some small probability of effectiveness, but one whose magnitude cannot be predicted by a companion diagnostic or any other reliable method.
Protocols based on population statistics may actually turn out to be discriminatory, because and insofar as they do not necessarily take into account patients' interests or patients' wishes. If the justification for withholding or rationing care also invokes the idea of the patient being "better off," does that justification also not become unacceptably paternalistic? As noted previously, the paternalistic approach to patient care has generally been supplanted by a shared decision-making model. The paradox is that voluntary informed consent is always required for invasive intervention, but it is not generally required for withholding care. A patient may decide to refuse surgery, but not so easily withholding of care.
None of this is meant to imply in any way that statistics and outcomes are irrelevant to decision making in any given case and for any given patient. They clearly are relevant. The question, rather, is, how such data are evaluated and used, and to what extent they become uncritically dispositive.
Two examples derived from the statistics on glioma survival published by Cancer Research UK and cited earlier may help. 19 First, on the basis of those data, should every patient under the age of 50 with a suspected glioblastoma multiforme undergo needle biopsy to determine whether or not their tumor shows a methylated MGMT gene? If so, how should the data be used? Should a protocol be established to the effect that with methylation, craniotomy with maximum feasible resection is indicated, without, no craniotomy should be performed? Second, what if a 51-year-old patient 1 year and 10 months out from the time of diagnosis and competent resection of an unmethylated tumor presents with significant recurrence and mass effect. How should this information be evaluated and used? Should the life expectancy of the set affect the decision for the individual? Should one recommend decompression of the recurrence or not?
Finally, what should the patient be told? Returning to the matter of fully informed consent, should patients be told of plausible treatment paths, which, irrespective of the adequacy or the applicability of data regarding efficacy in cases such as theirs, have simply been closed off? Is there an obligation to share the actual data with patients irrespective of the quality of the data? What happens if a patient were to say "even if there were only a 0.5% likelihood success, or just temporary respite, I would like to have the therapy?" Should that prerogative be retained?
It is very important to protect the prerogatives of patients and physicians even in the era of "big data." Big data does not per se create ethical issues assuming that the integrity of the data and analyses are assured. Big data produces a perspective on the "is" or the "facts." How these data should be used in designing health policy on a population basis, and, even more trenchantly, in a shared decision-making process with individual patients-the "ought" or the "value"-is another matter altogether.
A broader discussion of these points would consider matters of payment and prioritization, particularly in the face of measurably constrained resources face to face with individual cases. It is important to distinguish cases in which resources immediately available are constrained and require triage (eg, rare blood type for transfusion) from cases in which rationing is invoked as part of a population-based health care resource allocation policy (as in Oregon or, indeed, the Federal Government's Centers for Medicare Services). [20] [21] [22] [23] The references cited are not the dernier cri in the discussion on health care reform. Still, they provide very important color around the historical and ethical context of health care reform in the USA prior to the implementation of the ACA, and help explain why this ethical review is important.
CONCLUSION
The ACA is changing the relationship of government, the patient, and the practitioner. These changes are characteristic of most embodiments of health care reform and hardly unexpected. As outlined in other contributions to this supplement, they are highly likely to affect the practice of neurosurgeons in important, but unpredictable ways. Some parts of the reform may ultimately inure to the advantage of both the profession and improve the care of neurosurgical patients. Others less so. Even as it offers challenges, however, health care reform offers opportunities for neurosurgical leadership.
This discussion has reviewed 7 ethical issues of which neurosurgeons must be aware: While not the only ethical issues that matter, these 7 are particularly salient and important. They affect standards of practice, process, training, and reimbursement, as well as role opportunities and responsibilities for the profession. They are highly indicative of the issues that will increasingly confront the practicing neurosurgeon and of which the neurosurgeon must remain informed.
Finally, neurosurgeons have an obligation to hew to certain standards for patient care including acting in the best interests of their patients and advocating for their care. These standards are based on well-respected principles of medical ethics and are independent of the economic or political milieu in which neurosurgery is practiced.
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providers leads to uncoordinated care with unnecessary expense and neglect of needed care management; the health care system is rife with life-threatening errors and mistakes; quality of care is poorly defined and unrewarded; and incentives among the players in the health care contest are mal-aligned with each striving to profit individually, without a motive to cooperate to provide the best result at the lowest cost.
The policy solutions proposed to fix this accused systemic rot include elimination of fee-for-service payment and replacement with provider risk-based payment for either episodes of care or fixed time-based payment (capitation, or per-member-per-month pricing); integration of health care participants into large integrated and coordinated consortia; compensation or payment based on defined and measured quality criteria; reduced variation by standardized algorithms and pathways for treatment based on high-quality scientific evidence; coordinated care teams that communicate, follow standardized or ritualized protocols; funding shift away from specialty care and toward primary and preventive care; increased care coordination and oversight by new layers of management and standardized rules; consensus-based decision trees replacing individual professional judgment and autonomy; information standardization and improved accessibility by mandatory electronic medical record use; increased use of midlevel providers for routine, standardized uncomplicated services; and the rating and rewarding of individual performance based on standardized policy-driven criteria (patient satisfaction survey, resource utilization profile, adherence to standardized quality measures).
These reforms come with a price and a casualty: the traditional ethical relationship between the beneficiary of health care services (the patient) and the provider of those services (physicians, ancillary professionals, hospitals, and ambulatory service organizations). The physician is particularly vulnerable to ethical compromise, as the overriding responsibility to the individual patient is not so clearly articulated as in traditional ethical codes. Reform demands that the professional consider population health needs (the averaging of care over many) at least in balance, if not in preference, to individual health needs. It requires that individual variability, whether health care condition or personal preference, be diminished, disregarded or dismissed in favor of standardized protocols, pathways, and choices. It requires that the physician consider system cost at least in balance if not in preference to patient choice. It creates new barriers to specialty care (approvals, appeals, delays, denials, and inflexible treatment guidelines).
The competing ethical demands faced by physicians in modern practice was captured in Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter published in the Annals of Internal Medicine (Vol. 136, Feb. 5, 2002), 1 in which ethical behavior is defined by 4 patient interactions (competence, honesty, respect, and appropriate relations), which are balanced equally with 4 social interactions (improved quality, improved access, social justice by cost-effective care, scientific integrity) as physician ethical obligations. In an attempt to modernize the statement of physician ethical responsibilities, the "new social contract" expressed an expectation that social considerations have a claim equal to an individual patient's interests in commanding a physician's commitment. When social considerations supersede patient personal needs in a physician's ethical judgment, a patient cannot trust the physician to hold his or her interest foremost. Each ethical responsibility (social vs individual) has its appropriate place: social ethical responsibility is expressed in policy-making or advocacy; individual patient ethical responsibility is expressed in individual patient interactions, choices and recommendations; and the 2 roles must not be confused.
The 7 ethical issues described by the author capture the spirit, if not the full extent of the ethical conflict physicians face with health care reform: accountability to individual patients, financial incentives, conflicting interests, patient autonomy, information exchange, electronic medical record security, and appropriate or inappropriate use of "Big Data". In each instance, the author illustrates by example the ethical dilemma or conflict between new health care reform policies and technical capabilities, and traditional medical ethics in which the patient's interest is foremost and inviolable. In the end, the physician is still properly motivated by an altruism that considers the patient's personal best interest as the infallible guide in the doctor-patient relationship.
James R. Bean
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